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This paper examines the impact of the quality of the business environment as well as the monitoring capacity of the tax agency on firms' tax evasion and production decisions. First, the paper uses firm-level data for 30 African and Latin American countries to show that tax evasion and distortions stemming from the business environment are positively and significantly correlated, while sales not reported for tax purposes and institutional quality are negatively and significantly correlated. Second, the paper develops a general equilibrium model where heterogeneous firms make tax evasion decisions based on their assessment of the quality of their business environment as well as the monitoring capacity of the tax agency. The model simulations for each country in the African and Latin American sample show that the model can explain 35 percent of the variation in tax evasion and more than 49 percent of the dispersion in output per worker across the sample countries. Finally, a series of counterfactual experiments shows that, at the current level of deterrence, governments could decrease sales not reported for tax purposes by 21 percent, by reducing distortions stemming from the business environment by half. The paper presents empirical supporting evidence consistent with testable predictions of the model. This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Africa Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/research. The authors may be contacted at wkouame@worldbank.org.
I Introduction
A sound tax system and a healthy business environment are crucial for the welfare of an economy (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Aterido et al., 2011) . However, many African and Latin American economies face major challenges on both fronts. Indeed, high levels of tax evasion are ubiquitous in these countries. On average, 25% of total sales are not reported for tax purpose in African and Latin American countries compared with only 7% in OECD countries.
1 This shortfall has important social and economic consequences, as evaded taxes reduce a government's ability to invest in productive infrastructures and institutional quality, and to provide public goods and services. Moreover, insufficient government resources result in an inefficient business environment as various distortions (power outages, corruption, etc.) hinder firms' performance and their ability to create jobs (Besley and Burgess, 2004; Aterido et al., 2011; Buera et al., 2013; Goyette and Gallipoli, 2015) . As such, African and Latin
American economies fare poorly in terms of ease of doing business.
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The coexistence of tax evasion and inefficient business environments thus raises the question about a potential link between these variables in developing countries. This paper aims to examine how distortions stemming from the business environment and institutional quality, i.e., a tax agency's monitoring capacity, affect firms' production and tax evasion decisions.
We focus on two specific mechanisms. First, entrepreneurs, knowing that institutional quality is low, also anticipate low monitoring of taxes and have, therefore, more incentive to evade their taxes. Second, we argue that a poor business environment generates costs for firms and that this creates a wedge between firms' potential and realized profits. As a result, firms have an incentive to under-report their sales for tax purposes in order to compensate for the losses incurred due to the distortions in their business environment.
Using firm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) as well as data from the World Governance Indicators (WGI), we provide supporting evidence consistent 1 See with the mechanisms described above. Tax evasion is proxied by the amount of sales not declared for tax purposes. Distortions from the business environment are calculated based on the losses in annual sales due to power outages, corruption, etc. Finally, institutional quality is based on various variables related to the perceptions of the quality of public services and the credibility of the government. We find a positive and significant relationship between losses due to distortions from the business environment and tax evasion. On the contrary, institutional quality is negatively related to firms' tax evasion.
However, these relationships are subject to omitted variable bias, potential measurement error, and reverse causality. As a result, we are not able to identify, using standard econometrics, the mechanisms through which distortions and institutional quality affect firms' tax evasion behavior. Instead, we develop a general equilibrium model and use simulations to match the empirical evidence. Building on Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) , the economic environment consists of (i) one representative household which maximizes his inter-temporal utility, (ii) a government which balances its budget and, (iii) heterogeneous firms which maximize their profits and make tax evasion decisions based on their idiosyncratic productivity level as well as their idiosyncratic level of distortions stemming from the business environment. We calibrate the model to the United States and treat that country as an economy with no distortions as is standard in the literature. This benchmark economy allows normalizing GDP per worker in both the model and the data. The model is then simulated for each of the 30 African and Latin American countries from the WBES sample, using the benchmark distribution of productivity and the idiosyncratic distribution of losses due to the distortions from the business environment of a specific country.
The model explains 35 percent of the variation of tax evasion and 49 percent of the dispersion of output per worker in the data. The simulation for each region provides similar findings. As robustness checks, we calibrate the model to the Chilean economy, which exhibits the lowest combination of distortions and tax evasion in the data. Moreover, the model is simulated using an alternative measure of the deterrence probability. These additional robustness checks show that the findings remain robust, and the model explains at least 20 percent of the variation of tax evasion across countries in all cases.
Having established the ability of the model to replicate some relevant moments in the data related to tax evasion and output across African and Latin American countries, we conduct a set of tax neutral counterfactual experiments to examine various policy implications. First, we examine what happens in Guinea, the country with the highest level of tax evasion in the data, when distortions are reduced to the average level of the sample. Such improvements generate a drop between 18.34 and 40.16 percent in tax evasion while output per worker increases by between one-to six-fold. Second, we examine what happens when governments could reduce distortions stemming from the business environment by half. Such reduction could reduce sales not reported for tax purposes by about 21%.
This paper is closely related to Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Bah and Fang (2015) .
The authors argue in the former paper that a country's policies and institutions can create taxes or subsidies (distortions) on establishment output. These distortions reduce aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) and can explain up to 50% of the cross-country differences in output, capital accumulation, and TFP. Bah and Fang (2015) introduce distortions as an idiosyncratic tax on output in the general equilibrium model of Amaral and Quintin (2010) .
In addition to a distribution of productivity approximated with firms' size, Bah and Fang (2015) use the distribution of distortions from the data and collateral constraints to explain some of the variations in output in Africa. This paper differs from Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Bah and Fang (2015) by focusing on the effect of distortions and monitoring capacity on firms' tax evasion behavior. The paper highlights two mechanisms explaining the role of distortions stemming from the business environment and institutional quality on tax evasion in African and Latin American countries.
Well-developed infrastructures and institutions are essential to promoting economic growth by reducing transaction cost for firms as well as for households. Firms' performance is affected by the quality of infrastructures such as transport, energy, water, and sanitation as those infrastructures and services are used in the production processes and delivery of goods and services (Bah and Fang, 2015) . However, in developing countries, the cost of transportation, logistics, telecommunication, water, electricity, security, and bribes are high, and firms suffer great losses due to the poor quality of public infrastructures and services (Eifert et al., 2006) . The latter increases transaction costs and makes firms less competitive and productive than their international counterparts (Bah and Fang, 2015) . Similarly, inefficient institutions in developing countries create barriers to opportunities and increase costs and risks for microenterprises as well as multinationals (World Bank, 2005; Botero et al., 2004 ).
Inefficient institutions and policies limit market access and increase the size of the unofficial economy (Botero et al., 2004; López de Silanes et al., 2002) . Also, recent literature on policy distortions unanimously demonstrates that ineffective public policies lower aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) and explain an important share of TFP dispersion across countries (Hseih and Klenow, 2009; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2013; Wu, 2018) . The benefits of improving the institutional quality are not limited to developing countries as Prado (2011) shows on a sample of OECD countries that policies reducing regulation costs have a significant positive impact on the supply of both private and publicly produced goods, and effectively reduce the size of the informal sector. We show in this paper that distortions stemming from the business environment and institutional quality affect firms' tax evasion decisions and production.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the data and examines the relationship between distortions and firms' tax evasion empirically. Section III presents the theoretical model. In section IV, we calibrate the model using the United
States as a benchmark economy; we then describe our quantitative analysis and the results of the counterfactual experiments. Section V assesses the sensitivity of the findings. The concluding remarks and policy implications are discussed in section VI.
II Empirical Evidence
This section provides empirical evidence consistent with the testable predictions of the general equilibrium model in the next section. We first provide descriptive evidence before using a multilevel mixed model to examine the impact of distortionary infrastructures and policies on firms' tax evasion. The multilevel mixed model allows dealing with the hierarchic structure of the data and takes into account the potential dependence between firms of a given country. Moreover, this methodology allows including both microeconomic and macroeconomic variables while accounting for country fixed effects.
II.1 Data and descriptive statistics
We use the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) data which are a collection of a firmlevel surveys of a representative sample (random stratified sampling) of firms mainly in developing countries. Questionnaires cover a wide range of business environment topics like infrastructure, performance measures, crime, corruption, competition, access to finance.
The surveys are conducted within a framework of common guidelines in the design and implementation. A module of identical questions included in all questionnaires is used for assembling the data set, which allows cross-country comparisons. The analysis focuses on African and Latin American countries having at least 200 establishments as well as tax evasion and distortions data. The sample also excludes countries that were involved in armed conflicts over the period of the survey. We do so to ensure that the measure of institutional quality, as well as the costs stemming from the business environment, are not tainted by armed conflicts. All conclusions of the paper remain the same without these restrictions and using countries with at least 100 establishments. 4 The dataset employed in this paper does not include informal firms due to data issues. However, we acknowledge that informality is pervasive in developing countries and might be connected with low domestic resource mobilization. As discussed by Besley and Persson (2014) , the informal sector is inherently hard to tax because transactions are not recorded, and incomes from informal firms are difficult to measure. Moreover, informality is a source of misallocation (D'Erasmo and Boedo, 2012) affecting both productivity and tax collection (Ordóñez, 2014) . Consequently, we expect in this paper that the estimated effects of distortionary infrastructures and policies provide only lower bounds for tax evasion in African and Latin countries.
Tax evasion is captured by the proportion of total sales not reported for tax purposes.
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Distortions are measured as the sum of the losses (in percentage of total sales) due to power outage or surges from the public grid, insufficient water supply, unavailable main line telephone service, transport failures, crime (loss due to theft, robbery, vandalism or arson) and gifts or informal payment to public officials to "get things done".
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Institutional quality is proxied using a measure of the effectiveness of public policies from the World Governance Indicators (WGI). More particularly, institutional quality captures the perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. We use the percentile distribution of these public policies effectiveness variables.
In the regressions below, we also account for a set of firm individual characteristics. Firms' access to finance is measured as the share of working capital financed by commercial banks.
Regulatory burden is measured by the percentage of time the senior management spends dealing with requirements imposed by government regulation. We include the percentage of the firm owned by foreign interests and the government, firm's age captured by three categorical variables: young (1-5 years old), mature (6-15 years old), and older (more than 15 years old), and the percentage of the establishment's sales exported. Finally, we account for the size of the firms using four dummy variables capturing firms' size categories. Microenterprises have fewer than 10 permanent employees. Small and medium have between 11 and American countries, as the paper does not account for the distortions generated by informal firms and their impacts on tax collection.
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II.2 Methodology: Multilevel mixed model
This section examines the role of distortionary infrastructure and policies on firms' tax evasion using a multilevel mixed model. This model takes into account the fact that firms in a given country share similar contextual characteristics such as institutional environment, macroeconomic framework, and policies which affect their tax evasion behavior. Standard estimation methods ignore such clustering effects which generate biased standard errors. As firms in a given country may not be independent, standard errors in standard estimation methods may be underestimated. The model allows the intercept to vary across countries (Hox et al., 2010) . Moreover, this methodology allows to include both microeconomic and macroeconomic variables as well as country fixed effects. The approach considers a two-level model where the highest level is the country, and the lowest level is the firms such that:
Level 1:
Level 2:
Combining the two previous equations, the model can be written as follows:
where, ϑ c + ic is the error term of the model with ϑ c the country-specific error term and ic the firm-level error term. T ax_Evasion_ic refers to the proportion of sales not reported for tax purposes of the firm i in the country c. D ic denotes distortions, IQ c institutional quality, and X ic defines firm individual characteristics. All these variables are the same as defined previously. Finally, δ c , µ s , and η t refer to country, sector and year fixed effects respectively.
These fixed effects control for potentially important omitted variables at the country, sector and year level while accounting for differences in demand conditions, productive structure and culture of opportunistic behaviors. Table 2 reports the findings of the estimation of the equation (3). As it can be seen from the first row, distortions are positively related to firms' tax evasion. These coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent level and suggest that a 1 percent loss in total sales due to distortionary infrastructures increases firms' tax evasion from 0.11 to 0.14 percent.
II.3 Results
Conversely, sales not reported for tax purposes decrease with institutional quality (last row).
A one-unit increase in the index of the public policies effectiveness decreases firms' tax evasion from 62.79 to 70.71 percentage points.
Moreover, as it can be seen in columns (3) to (8) having a higher working capital financed by commercial banks decreases firms' tax evasion, suggesting that access to finance reduces the likelihood that an establishment under-reports its total sales for tax purposes. Financially constrained establishments seem to use tax evasion as an alternative source of financing or as a way to survive in a highly distorted environment. Columns (7) and (8) shows that larger and medium establishments are less likely to underreport sales for tax purposes (large firms are the omitted category). 7 Finally, foreign ownership status is negatively associated with firms' tax evasion. The coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 and 5 percent levels.
All estimates include country, sector and year fixed effects.
Although these results corroborate similar findings in the literature, one should treat them with caution as we do not tackle potential endogeneity issues such as omitted variable bias, potential measurement error, and reverse causality. Moreover, the empirical approach limits the possibility to identify the mechanisms through which the losses stemming from the poor business environment and public policies ineffectiveness affect firms' tax evasion.
That is why we develop a theoretical model in the next section, which allows examining two mechanisms relating distortions, institutional quality, and tax evasion behavior. Table 2 . Impacts of distortionary infrastructures and policies on firm's tax evasion Notes. The table presents the estimates of the effects of distortionary infrastructures and policies on firms' tax evasion using a multilevel mixed effects model. All regressions include country, sector, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-sector level in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.
III The model
In this section, we develop a general equilibrium model to analyze potential mechanisms linking distortions and institutional quality to firms' tax evasion decision. We identify two mechanisms that can explain the relationship between these variables. First, entrepreneurs,
knowing that institutional quality is low, also anticipate low monitoring of their taxes and have, therefore, more incentives to evade their taxes. The second mechanism is when distortionary infrastructures and policies generate losses for firms by creating a wedge between firms' potential and realized profits. We assume that firms compensate for some of these losses by evading their taxes.
The economic environment consists of (i) firms which maximize their profits and are heterogeneous along two dimensions: productivity and the level of distortions they face due to unsound business infrastructures and policies; (ii) one representative household which maximizes its inter-temporal utility, and (iii) a government which balances its budget.
III.1 Representative household
Consumers are aggregated through a representative household with preferences described by the following utility function:
where c t is consumption at date t and β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. The household is endowed with one unit of productive time in each period and K 0 > 0 units of the capital stock at date 0. We assume that u(c t ) satisfies the usual Inada conditions. The representative household maximizes its lifetime utility subject to the following budget constraint:
where, w t and r t are, respectively, the rental price of labor l t and capital K t at t, and N t the total labor supply to the market. We assume that the representative consumer does not value leisure, i.e. N t = 1. Finally, Π t is total profits from the operations of all firms.
III.2 Firms
Entrepreneurs are risk-neutral and produce a homogenous consumption good. Each establishment i makes production decisions to maximize profits based on an idiosyncratic productivity level z i , which is constant over time and varies across establishments. Values of the parameter z i , are drawn from a probability density function of g(z). The production function F (z i , A, k i , l i ) takes as input capital k i and labor l i . We include a variable A capturing institutional quality. This variable is the same for all the establishments in the same country and captures the quality of public policies formulation and implementation as well as the quality of public services. The production function is assumed to exhibit decreasing returns to scale in both capital and labor, and to satisfy the usual Inada conditions:
There is a proportional tax τ on establishments' total sales, which is assumed to have two components, τ c and τ In each period an establishment reports a proportion (1−ϑ i ) of its total sales for tax purposes based on its idiosyncratic level of distortions. Hence, each establishment evades a proportion ϑ i of its total sales. We assume there is a probability p to be detected for tax evasion. In this case, the evading firm must pay a fine. The expected fine is assumed to be a convex function of the establishment's tax evasion so that the marginal cost of tax evasion is positive and increasing in tax evasion:
The expected profit for an establishment with productivity z i is given by:
where c f is a fixed cost of operation for an incumbent establishment, p is the probability of detection, w and r are, respectively, the rental prices of labor and capital. T is the amount of total sales evaded. We assume that this amount is beneficial for the establishment (private benefit) but is a dead loss at the country level. By rearranging equation (4) we have
For the sake of simplicity, we abandon the index i; however, it is understood that z, k ,l, τ , ϑ are different for each establishment in what follows.
III.3 Government
The government provides public goods and services with institutional quality A by balancing its budget in each period:
The government revenues appear on the left hand side (LHS) of this equation. The first component is the revenues from proportional taxation on establishments' total sales. The second component is the revenues from detection activities. The right hand side (RHS) is the cost associated with the provision of institutional quality A and detection activities p which is assumed to be a convex cost function in both A and p.
III.4 Equilibrium
We consider the steady-state competitive equilibrium of the model in which the decision problems are described as follows.
III.4.1 Consumer's problem
Using the first order conditions, we find a solution to the consumer's problem with the rental price of capital r and the consumption c being constant, that is:
III.4.2 Incumbent establishment's problem
Solving for the first order conditions, the optimal tax evasion and factor demands are:
Given that the establishment-level productivity and tax rate are constant over time, the discounted present value of an incumbent establishment is given by :
where ρ = 1−λ 1+r−δ is the discount rate for the establishment and λ the probability of death which is assumed to be constant. Substituting ρ in equation (10) we have
III.4.3 Entry
Establishments' entry decision is made on the basis of the distribution over potential draws for the pair (z, τ ). Letx(z, τ ) denote the optimal entry decision with the convention that the establishment enters and remains in operation ifx(z, τ ) = 1. The actual discounted value of a potential entrant V e is given by:
where, c e is the entry cost paid by a new establishment, and g(z, τ ) is the probability density function. In an equilibrium with entry, the free entry condition is fulfilled for V e (z, τ ) = 0. In the steady state and according to equations (6) and (11), V (z, τ ) is determined only by the endogenous variable w. Hence, there is a unique value of the wage rate w for which V e = 0 as in Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) .
III.5 Invariant distribution of establishment
Let E and µ(z, τ ) denote, respectively, the mass of entrants and the distribution of firms in period t. Given the decision rule for production of entering establishmentsx(z, τ ), the next period distribution of firms µ over the pair (z, τ ) satisfies the following condition:
where (1 − λ)µ(z, τ ) refers to the mass of incumbent establishments that have survived, andx(z, τ )d(z, τ )E represents the mass of entering establishments that enter and remain in operation. The unique invariant distribution of establishmentμ(z, τ ) is characterized by a constant distribution of µ over time and a death rate bounded away from 0. This invariant distribution of establishments is given by:
III.5.1 Labor market clearing
Given values for w and r, the steady state of this model is characterized by the functions ϑ(z, τ ),k(z, τ ),l(z, τ ),x(z, τ ) and the associated invariant distribution of establishmentŝ µ(z, τ ). Using these functions, the aggregate labor demand and the steady-state equilibrium level of entry are given by:
III.5.2 Definition of a competitive equilibrium
The steady-state competitive equilibrium with entry is a set of prices {w * , r * }, a set of decision rules {k * , l * , ϑ * ; c * , K * }, a distribution of establishments µ(z, τ ), value functions
, and a mass of entry E such that :
1. Given prices (w, r) and preferences, the pair {c * , K * } maximizes the consumer lifetime utility;
2. Given prices (w, r), the functions π(z, τ ), V (z, τ ), and V e (z, τ ) solve incumbent and entering establishment's problems, with {k * , l * , ϑ * } the optimal policy functions;
3. The free-entry and invariant distribution conditions are satisfied i.e.
4. Market clearing conditions are satisfied :
III.6 Theoretical predictions
From the optimal tax evasion equation (7), we can draw two predictions:
Prediction 1:
An increase in distortions stemming from business environment increases firms' tax evasion. 
IV Quantitative model
In this section, we calibrate the model using the United States economy and then simulate it on a sample of 30 African and Latin American countries.
IV.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated on the United States, which is considered as an economy with no distortions as is standard in the literature. Several of the parameter values are assigned following the literature. The period in the model corresponds to one year in the data.
Preferences. The yearly interest rate is targeted to 4% as in Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Bah and Fang (2015) . This implies a value of β = 1 (1+0.04) = 0.96.
Technology. We follow the literature by using 0.85 as the returns to scale of the production function.
8 Parameter values η and γ are attributed to match capital and labor shares of income, respectively, of the returns to scale of the production function. We choose δ so that the investment to output ratio is equal to 20%, implying δ = 0.08 as in Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) . The range of employment across establishments in the data determines the range of establishment-level productivity. According to the United States data from the Census Bureau, 9 the number of employees at the establishment level ranges from 1 to 10,000.
Hence, the minimum and maximum levels of productivity are chosen to obtain the range of employment, as in the data. Normalizing the lowest firm-level productivity to 1, the highest level of productivity is chosen to obtain the maximum number of employees of 10,000, as in the data. We approximate the distribution of establishment-level productivity with 100 grid points. We choose a log-spaced grid so that the invariant distribution of establishment size across employment level matches the data. Descriptive statistics about firms highlight one important stylized fact. Establishments with fewer than 20 employees represent 86.1 percent of all the establishments. However, these establishments account only for 24.9 percent of the employment.
Distortions We use the distortions from WBES in the same way as we did in the empirical section as a proxy of distortionary infrastructures. As mentioned previously, we sum up the percentage of sales lost due to poor infrastructure and services (losses due to power outage or surges from public grid, insufficient water supply, unavailable mainline telephone service, transport failures); crime (losses due to theft, robbery, vandalism or arson against the establishment); and corruption (informal payments to "get things done"). For a given country, we compute losses for each establishment and use the distribution of distortionary infrastructures across establishments in the simulation.
Institutional Quality
We calibrate institutional quality A using the measure of public policies effectiveness from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) as described above.
Recall that this variable is defined as perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. We use the percentile distribution of policy effectiveness variable ranged from 0 to 1. 10 In the calibration, we approximate the detection probability using this index of public policies effectiveness. We argue that effective government in formulating and implementing public policies will also be effective in detecting illegal activities such as tax evasion. In the sensitivity analysis, we relax this assumption using an alternative measure of detection probability and show that the predictions of the paper remain the same and are not driven by this assumption.
In the model, the cost of tax evasion for an establishment is assumed to be a convex function, with a convexity parameter θ > 2. This assumption guarantees that the marginal cost of tax evasion is positive and increasing with the share of sales not reported for tax purposes.
The convexity parameter θ is calibrated to 3. Sensitivity analysis shows that the findings are 10 To the best of our knowledge, the proportional tax rate on sales is not publicly available for each country in the sample. Calibrating institutional quality using the data allows us minimizing errors arising from a not accurate calibration of the proportional tax rate on sales τ c for each country. The proportional tax rate on sales τ c is therefore normalized to 0 in the quantitative model. robust using alternative values of θ. (2015), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) , Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) and Pavcnik (2002) for parameter values from the literature.
IV.2 Quantitative analysis
The quantitative analysis consists in validating the model and conducting counterfactual experiments to assess the implications of changes in the distortions stemming from the business environment and the detection probability.
IV.2.1 Validation of the model
We simulate the model for 30 African and Latin American countries using the calibrated parameters described above. For each country, the model predicts the level of tax evasion and output per worker. 
IV.2.2 Counterfactual experiments
Having established the ability of the model to replicate some of the variations of tax evasion and output per worker across African and Latin American countries, we conduct in this section three tax neutral counterfactual experiments to examine the implications of changes in the distortions stemming from the business environment and the detection probability. Tax neutral experiments guarantee that the tax revenues remain the same as in the benchmark.
In those experiments, the tax revenues from the decrease in tax evasion are used as a subsidy to production, i.e., the price of the final good is now a function of this subsidy.
The counterfactual experiments focus on Guinea, the country with the highest level of tax evasion in the data. We first examine what happens regarding tax evasion, ceteris paribus, when the losses stemming from the business environment in Guinea are reduced to the average level observed in the sample. In particular, we replace the distribution of losses stemming from business environment across size in Guinea by the average distribution of losses across firms' size from the sample. All the parameters of the model remain the same as previously, except the losses stemming from the business environment. In the second experiment, we explore the second mechanism by examining the impact of a change in Guinea's deterrence probability. In particular, we increase the deterrence probability by 50 percent in Guinea. All other parameters remain the same. Finally, we combine in a third experiment both changes, i.e., a distribution of distortions similar to the average level of the sample and a detection probability 50% larger. Table 5 reports the change on key variables relative to the baseline findings on Guinea.
Experiment 1. In the first scenario, we conduct a tax neutral experiment analysis and set the distribution of losses stemming from business environment to the average level by size category in the sample. As described in Table 4 , the distribution of losses by size in Guinea is between 14.97 and 20.60 percent of sales, whereas in the sample the latter is between 5.18 and 7.36 percent of their sales. On average, counterfactual experiment 1 corresponds to a 65.25 percent drop in the losses stemming from the business environment in Guinea. The results show that a drop to the average level by size category generates a 26.72 percent drop in sales not reported for tax purposes in Guinea. Guinean firms' sales not reported for tax purposes decline from 53.74 percent to 39.38 percent. As discussed above, losses stemming from the business environment are a proportional tax on firms' sales and create therefore a wedge between potential and realized profits. In such environment, a drop in additional costs stemming from business environment decreases sales not reported for tax purposes as witnessed in experiment 1. Using the proceeds from increased tax revenues to subsidize production, a drop in distortionary infrastructures in Guinea to the average level of the sample generates a 1.06-fold increase in output per worker. The aggregate TFP is one of the channels through which the output per worker is stimulated. As Table 5 shows, the aggregate TFP increases slightly by 0.16 percent. Also, a drop in distortions stemming from the business environment stimulates the entry of firms in the market and the aggregate capital as both increase by 22 percent.
This experiment seems to benefit more to medium and large firms, which represent firms having between 20-100 and more than 100 employees. The share of firms in both groups increases by about 8.23 and 2.12 percent respectively while the share of small firms in the distribution of establishments decreases by 0.98 percent. Moreover, this experiment generates a scale effect as the average size of firms increases by 21.52 percent. This is a direct consequence of the increase in the share of medium and large firms in the distribution of establishments. Finally, this experiment implies a reallocation of the labor force towards large firms. The share of total employment in large firms grows by around 3 percent, while both medium and small firms face a drop in their employment share.
Experiment 2. In the second counterfactual experiment, we examine what happens in Guinea when the detection probability can be improved by 50 percent while the distribution of losses stemming from the business environment is left untouched. When the detection probability is increased from 0.0634 to 0.0951, sales not reported for tax purposes decline from 53.73 percent to 43.88 percent, corresponding to a 18.34 percent drop in firms' tax evasion in Guinea. The improvement of the institutional quality raises the expected costs related to tax evasion activities as monitoring and auditing increase. Consequently, the incentive for firms to underreport their sales for tax purposes declines.
In this tax neutral experiment, the output per worker is nearly 6.33-fold as large as the initial output per worker of the country. The evidence is consistent with the literature on the missing middle in the size distribution of firms in developing countries, where the quality of the business environment is identified as 11 Although the change in the output per worker might appear high, they are in line with similar evidence in the literature. IMF (2003) shows for instance that improving the quality of institutions in Cameroon (-0.72) to the average level of institutions in the sample (0.13) generates almost a 5-fold increase in income per capita in Cameroon. Rodrik et al. (2004) find that one standard deviation increase in institutional quality generates a 6.4-fold difference in income per capita. Similarly, Acemoglu et al. (2001) show that improving the quality of institutions in Nigeria to the level of Chile could lead to a 7-fold increase in Nigeria's income. Also, Hall and Jones (1999) show in a cross-country regression that difference in institutions between Niger and the United States which is only 3.78-fold is more than enough to explain the 35-fold difference in output per worker. The contribution of Hall and Jones (1999) , one of the most important in the literature, highlights how a small change in institutions can generate an exponential variation in output per worker. a critical factor explaining the limited number of medium-sized firms.
12 The counterfactual experiment shows that improving the quality of business environment favors the distribution of firms toward medium-sized firms. Moreover, the experiment shows no scale effect. The average size of firms decreases slightly by 4.69 percent. Finally, the improvement in the institutional quality generates a reallocation of the labor force towards medium firms, which account for an 8.86 percent increase in employment share.
Experiment 3. Finally, we combine both changes, i.e., a reduction in distortions by 65.25%
on average and an increase in detection by 50% and observe a decrease in tax evasion by 40.16 percent, i.e., sales not reported for tax purposes declines from 53.74 percent to 32.16 percent, while the output per worker is now nearly 6.26-fold larger than its initial level. As it can be seen, the combination of a drop in losses stemming from the business environment with an improvement of the institutional quality generates a more substantive decline in sales not reported for tax purposes relative to previous experiments. In this experiment, both changes contribute to improving the overall business environment. Qualitatively the channels are similar to those described above: as distortions in infrastructures drop and institutional quality increases, the aggregate TFP, the mass of firms entering on the market, and the aggregate capital increase by 185.86 and 200.22 percent respectively. Moreover, we observe a reallocation of firms towards medium and large firms and a scale effect. As Table 5 shows, the shares of medium and large firms increase 8.23 and 2.12 percent respectively. The average size of firms grows by 20.99 percent suggesting thereby a scale effect. Finally, this experiment generates a reallocation of the labor force towards large firms. The total employment share of large firms increases by about 3 percent, while the employment shares of small and medium firms decrease by 16.43 and 6.53 percent respectively.
12 See for instance Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys (2002) and Tybout (2000) for extensive discussion on the missing middle in developing countries. In summary, the counterfactual experiments show that a drop in losses stemming from the business environment along with an improvement in detection probability in Guinea could decrease sales not reported for tax purposes by between 17.78 and 32.86 percent. The drop in tax evasion combined with the improvement in institutional quality generate between a 1.06-and 6.33-fold increase output per worker in Guinea through their effects on the aggregate TFP, the mass entering on the market, and the reallocation of firms and employment.
V Sensitivity analysis
This section assesses the sensitivity of the findings simulating the model for each region, employing alternative detection probability and a recalibrating the model on the Chilean economy.
V.1 Simulations for each region
So far, the model shows the role of distortionary infrastructures and policies in explaining the variation in tax evasion and output per worker across African and Latin American countries.
In this section, we simulate the model for the two groups of countries separately. The intuition of this exercise is twofold. First, we evaluate how the model fares in explaining the variation of tax evasion and GDP per worker within each region. Second, we show that compositional effects across the continents do not drive the findings of the paper. The simulation procedure is the same as previously, except that we are now focusing on each region. 
V.2 Alternative detection probability
In the baseline calibration, we use the same variable to capture both institutional quality and the detection probability. As argued previously, the level of institutional quality may send an equivalent signal of the level of monitoring and auditing, i.e., the detection probability. However, this assumption can raise questions as the latter may drive our findings. In this section,
we check the sensitivity of the results using the perception of the control of corruption as an alternative measure of the detection probability. The latter is from the World Governance
Indicators' database and is defined as the perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. We use the percentile ranking of the index which is ranged between 0 and 1. The simulation procedure is the same as previously, and the model is calibrated to the United States economy. Secondly, we use so far the difference in both the detection probability and the level of distortionary infrastructures to explain 35% of the variation of tax evasion across African and Latin American countries. Using such approach, we are unable to distinguish between the effects of deterrence policies and distortionary infrastructures on tax evasion, while the distinction can be highly relevant regarding policy implications. Alternatively, we conduct a counterfactual experiment consisting of setting the same level of detection probability for all the countries.
The latter corresponds to the average level of the detection probability in the sample. We further examine how much the difference in losses stemming from the business environment can explain the variation of tax evasion across African and Latin American countries. The calibration and simulation procedures are the same as previously, except that the detection probability is the same for all the countries. 
V.3 Alternative calibration
The analysis so far relied on the model that is calibrated to the United States' economy. However, the latter can raise criticism the parameters for the United States and those for African and Latina American economies might be different. As a sensitivity check, we recalibrate the model to the Chilean economy, the country with the lowest combination of distortions and tax evasion in our data and one of the largest sample size.
The parameter value for the labor share in Chile is set to the average share of labor income in the GDP from the ILOSTAT. 13 We set labor share to be 0.414 which is the average labor's share in the GDP. 14 As in the baseline calibration, we assume a decreasing return in the firm-level production function. The extent of the returns is obtained under the assumption 13 The ILOSTAT is the world leading data source on labor statistics from the International Labour Organization (ILO). The data can be downloaded from the following website: http://www.ilo.org/ilostat.
14 The average labor's share of the GDP is available for 2009, 2011, and 2013 . 
VI Conclusion
Firms in developing countries face considerable constraints in their development due to distortionary infrastructures and policies, and weak institutions. In parallel, tax evasion is widespread and pervasive in these countries, generating a substantial negative effect on domestic resource mobilization as well as on government's ability to provide infrastructure and public goods. African and Latin American countries rank poorly in terms of ease of doing business, with around one-quarter of annual sales not reported for tax purposes. As a novelty, this paper examines empirically and theoretically the impacts of distortionary infrastructures and institutional quality on firms' tax evasion in African and Latin American countries.
The paper sheds light on two potential mechanisms driving firms' tax evasion which have not been given a lot of attention in the literature. First, entrepreneurs, knowing that government effectiveness is weak, also anticipate low monitoring and have, therefore, more incentive to evade their taxes. In the second mechanism, distortions and poor institutional quality generate losses for firms by creating a wedge between potential and realized profits. Tax evasion is a way for firms to counterbalance the negative effects of distortionary infrastructures and policies. This paper provides supporting evidence of the negative impact of distortionary infrastructures and policies on firms' tax evasion. In particular, using WBES data, we show that losses stemming from the business environment are positively correlated with firms' tax evasion. Using WGI data, we show that institutional quality is negatively related to the proportion of sales not reported for tax purposes.
To understand the mechanisms through which distortionary infrastructures and policies affect firms' tax evasion, we develop a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms.
The model is calibrated using the United States as a benchmark economy. We simulate tax evasion and output data for firms in a sample of 30 African and Latin American countries. 
